If you can't see this email, click here

Legal News. European Banking Law. January 2021


The Court of Auditors highlights the progress that has been made in the SRM since 2015. It considers, despite everything, that "some key elements are missing and further steps are needed in resolution planning for banks".
The Court notes that it is difficult to achieve uniform treatment of banks, not least because the practices of internal resolution teams vary. It believes that internal resolution teams should be required to comply with SRB policies or at least provide explanations (―to apply a comply-or-explain approach‖) if they deviate from these policies.
It is noted that the SRB has assessed the quality of the resolution plans submitted by the National Resolution Authorities (of the less significant banks).
It has insisted on several occasions on the need to have clear, objective and quantified thresholds to determine whether a bank is failing or is likely to fail. We agree that the legal framework could be improved to establish more objective and quantified criteria, but there will always be a margin of discretion in the specific case, whether we like it or not.
Gender Balance
We are not discovering anything new if we draw attention to the scarce presence of women in the economic and financial field of the European Union. This is precisely what the European Parliament has done again in its Resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations (OJEU 21/1).
At the date of approval of the Resolution "only one out of six Members of the ECB Executive Board is a woman", and "only two out of 25 Members of the ECB
The European Parliament says here that "the Council has not taken this request seriously".
Simplification and non-performing loans
Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‗Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU as regards information requirements, product governance and position limits to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic‘, on ‗Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as regards the EU Recovery prospectus and targeted adjustments for financial intermediaries to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic‘, on ‗Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic‘ and on ‗Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards adjustments to the securitisation framework to support the economic recovery in response to the COVID-19 pandemic‘ (OJ 11/01)
The EESC recognizes that the amendments "seek to substantially simplify the documentation and requirements regulating the financial markets, especially the MiFID II provisions". The aim is ―to lessen the administrative burden on banking and financial operators and so free up resources for investment in economic recovery". The EESC supports the Commission's objective of reducing compliance costs, as well as reducing the production of paper documentation.
The EESC notes that "dealing with non-performing exposures easier (...) allows banks to free part of their balance sheets and so boost their lending capacity at a time when this capacity is vital". It further notes that "the regulatory framework for securitization of bad loans (...) presents rigidities that may adversely affect the real economy".
The EESC notes that the "NPL Backstop Regulation (…) requires the devaluation of NPLs within a strict timetable that fails to take due account of the real economic value of the collateral on these loans. These strict timetables in loan devaluations were already causing difficulties in the management of NPLs on the secondary market before the outbreak of the pandemic‖.
Finally, the EESC points out that "the EU has taken over internal regulation risks benefiting those operating in the European single market while maintaining their own registered offices and capital outside the EU and, at least in part, its system of rules".
Central counterparties


Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 11 November 2020 (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof — Austria) — DenizBank AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation [Preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive (EU) 2015/2366 – Payment services in the internal market – Article 4(14) – Concept of ‗payment instrument‘ – Personalised multifunctional bank cards – Near-field communication (NFC) functionality – Article 52(6)(a) and Article 54(1) – Information to be provided to users – Change in the conditions of a framework contract – Tacit consent – Article 63(1)(a) and (b) – Rights and obligations related to payment services – Derogation for low-value payment instruments – Conditions under which applicable – Payment instrument that does not allow its blocking – Payment instrument used anonymously – Limitation of the temporal effects of the judgment]
European Banking Public Law

Juan Antonio Ureña Salcedo
Jean Monnet Chair Universitat de València

The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.
Copyright © 2021, European Banking Public Law. All rights reserved.

Nuestra dirección de contacto es:

¿Quieres darte de baja?
Puedes darte de baja aquí